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Cost-effectiveness analysis, which ranks projects by quality adjusted life years gained per dollar 
spent, is widely used in the evaluation of health interventions. We show that cost effectiveness 
analysis can be derived from two axioms: society prefers Pareto improvements and society 
values discounted life years, lived in perfect health, equally for each person. These axioms 
generate a unique social preference ordering, allowing us to find the cost effectiveness threshold 
to which health projects should be funded, and to extend cost effectiveness analysis to give a 
consistent method of project evaluation across all sectors of the economy.    
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"the cost of a thing is the amount of what I will  
call life which is required to be exchanged for it" 
       Walden, Henry David Thoreau 
 
1. Introduction 
In the health sector there is unease about the idea that we should value lives in terms of 
people's willingness, and ability, to pay. The ethical difficulties involved in cost-benefit analysis 
have led to the use of cost-effectiveness analysis (Weinstein and Stasson (1977)) in which 
projects are evaluated in terms of the life years gained per dollar spent.  The use of this criterion  
assumes society values lives, or more precisely discounted, quality adjusted, life years, equally 
across people and wants to maximize the total number of life years produced, independently of 
who gets them. 
Detailed standards for cost effectiveness analysis have been produced by the World 
Health Organization  (Edejer et al. (2003)) and are widely used as a criterion for priority setting 
among health interventions (e.g. Jamison et al. (2006)). Medical journals frequently publish 
articles that estimate the cost effectiveness of particular treatments and procedures, and it could 
be argued it is the most common method of economic project appraisal
1. In Britain, the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence explicitly uses cost effectiveness as a criterion in 
selecting treatments for use in the National Health Service, and recommends procedures that 
meet a cost effectiveness threshold (Devlin and Parkin (2004)).  In the United States, cost 
effectiveness is not used as a criterion for Medicare provision but it has been argued that its use 
could improve the quality of services and reduce costs (Neumann et al. (2005)).  
                                                 
1 A search of the ISI Web of Knowledge database of academic articles produced  16,678 articles with ‘cost 
effectiveness’ or 'cost effective' in the title and 3,632 articles with 'cost benefit'  in the title (searching independently 
of word ordering) .  
  1In cost effectiveness analysis we value the discounted quality adjusted life years of each 
person equally. This contrasts with cost benefit analysis where projects are evaluating by 
summing each person’s willingness to pay in money units. Cost effectiveness analysis is 
inconsistent with cost benefit analysis except under extreme assumptions on the nature of 
individual preferences (Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999), Johannesson (1995), Dolan and Edlin 
(2002)) or assuming that the distributions of income and health are already socially optimal 
(Hansen et al. (2004)). 
The fact that cost effectiveness and cost benefit analysis are usually inconsistent makes it 
difficult to allocate resources coherently between the health sector and other sectors of the 
economy. In particular, cost effectiveness analysis can allocate a fixed health budget between 
competing health interventions but has no way of deciding what the size of the health budget 
should be. Setting the health budget is equivalent to society setting a money value on a quality 
adjusted life year, but the willingness to pay for a life year differs across people, and there is at 
present no clear way to amalgamate these valuations.    
One response to these problems would be to abandon cost effectiveness analysis and use 
cost benefit analysis for health projects just as we do for other projects in other sectors of the 
economy (Fuchs and Zeckhauser (1987)).  This leads to higher levels of health care for those 
with a greater willingness to pay but dismisses the strong ethical appeal of the argument that life 
is different from other commodities. Life, particularly healthy life, can be argued to have a 
special moral importance on the grounds that it is a prerequisite for the opportunity to carry out 
other activities (Daniels (2008)). Life and health also have a privileged role in the capabilities 
approach to evaluating wellbeing on the grounds that they are essential to a having a reasonable 
  2opportunity set and freedom of choice (Sen (1985), Sen (1999)).  We may therefore recognize a 
moral claim to healthy life without recognizing claims to other goods in the same way. 
Cost effectiveness analysis usually begins by assuming that we wish to maximize 
discounted quality adjusted life years gained with a fixed health budget. The weakness of this 
approach is that it leaves open the question of how health care should be financed and how to 
judge interventions in other sectors, such as transport, which have both economic and health 
outcomes. Our approach is to find ethical axioms that apply to all social decisions. We choose 
these axioms so that cost effectiveness as currently employed is the correct decision rule in the 
health sector and investigate the implication of these axioms for other social choices.    
Our first axiom is the Pareto principle; a project that makes no one worse off and at least 
one person better off should be socially preferred. This axiom guarantees efficiency. We also 
require a second axiom on society’s preferences on distribution.  We assume that if everyone 
maintained their current endowment of other goods, but had perfect health, society would value 
additional discounted life years equally across individuals.  If every person has perfect health, 
and their current endowment of other goods, the only thing that varies between possible states is 
the life span of each person. In comparing across these states with perfect health status but 
different life spans for different individuals we assume society always prefers a state with a 
higher sum of discounted life years to a state with a lower sum.   
We show that, taken together, the Pareto principle, and the assumption that society values 
lives in perfect health equally, generate a unique social preference ordering over states and this 
social preference ordering implies the use of cost effectiveness analysis in the health sector. A 
fixed sum allocated to health should be spent to maximize the sum of discounted, quality 
adjusted life years gained, independently of who gets them, which implies implementing projects 
  3in order of their cost effectiveness.  The quality adjustment factor for each individual is the rate 
they are willing to trade life years in their current health state for life years lived in perfect 
health.  
Our approach extends the work of Garber and Phelps (1997) and Meltzer (1997) who 
analyze how cost effectiveness analysis can be derived from the optimal decision making of an 
individual. The Pareto efficiency axiom implies that the health interventions used by an 
individual maximize their utility given their budget constraint. Our second axiom extends their 
approach by allowing for comparisons across people.    
While our axiomatic approach can be used to justify cost effectiveness analysis it can also 
be used to extend its reach. We show that the unique social preference ordering generated by our 
two axioms can be represented by a utilitarian social welfare function. We simply ask each 
person how many life years, lived at full health and their current endowment of other goods, 
would be required to make them indifferent to any proposed social state. This gives a measure of 
the utility of the state for each person in terms of equivalent quality adjusted life years.  Social 
welfare at the proposed social state is the just the sum of these discounted quality adjusted life 
years across people. 
Any public choice problem can then be addressed by finding the policy that maximizes 
this social welfare function. Usually cost effectiveness analysis provides a ranking of health 
projects but leaves open where the threshold for funding should be placed.  We use our social 
welfare function to derive the optimal threshold (in terms of dollars per quality adjusted life year 
gained) for projects that should be funded, which is equivalent to deciding how much should be 
spent on the health sector. We show that the optimal threshold depends on the method of funding 
– we find results for lump sum transfers and a proportional income tax.  The funding method 
  4matters because our social welfare function values everything in quality adjusted life years.   The 
"cost" of the money used to finance the health system is the quality adjusted life years those who 
pay for the system would be willing to give up to retain the money.  Since this varies across 
people, and the method of financing affects who pays, the financing method affects the "cost" of 
the funds and where the threshold should be set.  
An implication of our axioms is that society cares about poverty as well as the average 
level of income. Redistributing money from the rich to the poor will  improve social welfare if 
the willingness to pay for a life year is higher for rich people than poor people (which is another 
way of saying that the value of money, measured in life years, is higher for the poor than the 
rich).  
The social preference ordering our framework generates can also be used to evaluate 
projects in other sectors of the economy.  Using our cost effectiveness axioms the net benefit of a 
project is the sum of the willingness of people to pay for the project in discounted quality 
adjusted life years.  This “life-metric” approach to measuring willingness to pay tends to give 
more weight to the preferences to the poor than standard “money metric” cost benefit analysis; a 
rich man may often be willing to pay more money than a poor man for a project, while not being 
willing to give up more life years.  In terms of cost benefit analysis all we do is move form the 
usual measurement of willingness to pay in money units, to willingness to pay measured in 
quality adjusted life years. However, in welfare analysis the choice of numeraire has real effects 
(Berlage and Renard (1985), Brekke (1997)) because the numeraire becomes an interpersonally 
comparable unit of value.  
There are three reasons why the results in this paper may appear surprising at first sight. 
The first is Arrow’s impossibility theorem which appears to rule out a consistent social 
  5preference ordering of the type we construct.  Arrow (1950) puts forward four desirable 
properties for a social choice mechanism, and shows that it impossible for a mechanism to 
possess all four properties. Our approach avoids Arrow’s impossibility theorem by adhering to 
only two of his four desirable properties. Our social ordering obeys the Pareto principle and non-
dictatorship. However it is incomplete; we cannot rank all preferences. In particular we limit our 
analysis to people who want longer, rather than shorter, life spans. We also violate the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom. When comparing two arbitrary health states we 
require the existence of an “irrelevant” third state, perfect health, to measure them against.   
The second is that it has been shown that always valuing lives equally is inconsistent with 
the Pareto principle  (Weinstein and Manning (1997), Hasmanand and Østerdal (2004)), and thus 
our two axioms appear inconsistent. However, we do not value all lives equally. We assume that 
if people had perfect health and their current endowment of other goods society would value 
their discounted life years equally. We assume society puts equal value only on life years lived in 
this state and may put a higher, or lower, value on life years lived with a different health status, 
or a different endowment of other goods.  
The third issue is that our second axiom appears to be non-welfarist in the sense that it 
does not depend on individual preferences; society prefers people to have longer life spans 
independently of what they themselves want.  Kaplow and Shavell (2001) show that any non-
welfarist social preferences necessarily violate the Pareto principle for some individual 
preferences.  However, we limit admissible individual preferences to those where additional 
lifespan is desirable for every person. This means that we do not have a conflict between 
individual preferences and social preferences. 
  6An objection to the results in this paper is that the second axiom, that society values 
discounted life years lived in perfect health, with the current endowment of other goods, equally 
for each person is somewhat arbitrary. We could value life years lived at some other reference 
point, with imperfect health or a different endowment of other goods, equally, giving different 
results. We could take some other commodity, such as money, as our standard and argue that 
society values additional units of money equally for each person. 
We consider the second axiom to be a statement of the cost effectiveness principle on a 
limited domain. At the current endowment of goods, but perfect health for every person, we 
would value additional discounted life years equally for each person.  We think that someone 
who advocates cost effectiveness analysis as currently practiced would subscribe to this axiom. If 
they also accept the Pareto principle that society prefers Pareto improvements, we show that they 
then have a particular social preference ordering over all states of the economy. This includes 
how to quality adjust life years when people are not in perfect health, how to set the cost 
threshold that cost effective interventions need to achieve to be financed, how to rank projects in 
other sectors of the economy, and the welfare effects of redistributing income.  Our approach 
makes clear the ethical axioms that are required to underpin cost effectiveness analysis and the 
implications of these axioms for other public choices.  
We leave open the issue of whether the axioms we use are defensible on ethical grounds. 
People who think that health care should be allocated to maximize aggregate health,  
independently of willingness to pay, who care about poverty reduction, and think Pareto 
improvements are desirable may be attracted to the axioms we propose and using a life year 
metric for social welfare. Our approach shows how to combine these views into a consistent 
method of social choice.  
  7However our second axiom incorporates views on distribution and there may be a dispute 
about what constitutes a desirable distribution.  People who think that money is equally valuable 
to each person and who consequently see no benefit in income redistribution, and who think that 
health care should be distributed to those most willing to pay for it, will be attracted by cost-
benefit analysis and using a money metric in social decisions.  
While the use of cost benefit analysis rather than the generalized cost effectiveness 
analysis proposed here is at heart an issue of social preferences on distribution, generalized cost 
effectiveness, based on our axiomatic approach, also has some technical advantages. We show it 
generates a consistent method of social choice over the whole economy, so that if state A is 
strictly socially preferred to state B then B is not preferred to A. In addition the rule is transitive 
so if state A is socially preferred to state B, and B is socially preferred to C, then A is socially 
preferred to C. Project evaluation using cost benefit analysis does not provide a consistent 
ordering, exhibiting preference reversals, so that moving from A to B may be desirable on a cost-
benefit criterion while once we are at B moving back to A may also be desirable. Ranking states 
using a cost-benefit decision rule also lacks transitivity (Blackorby and Donaldson (1985)) .                
  In section 2 we consider a stylized model of the economy and individual preferences. In 
section 3 we assume that society prefers Pareto improvements and that society values additional 
discounted life years lived at in perfect health, and current endowments of other goods, equally 
for each person. These assumptions are shown to imply the existence of a unique, well behaved, 
social preference ordering for our economy. In section 4 we show how cost effectiveness 
analysis follows from our social preference ordering and in section 5 we examine how the 
threshold for cost effective projects should depend on the method used to finance the health 
  8system.  In section 6 we generalize cost effectiveness analysis to rank projects in all sectors of 
the economy.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Individual Preferences 
We assume that there exist 3 types of commodities: traded goods, non-traded goods, and life 
span. We also assume that there is no uncertainty. An allocation for a consumer is a bundle 
(,,) x zl where 
G x R ∈ is the vector of consumption of the G traded goods, 
H zR ∈ is the vector of 
consumption of H non-traded goods and  [0, ) l∈ ∞  is lifespan. We can think of health status as 
one of the non traded goods. 
  We assume that the consumer has a complete, reflexive, transitive, and continuous 
preference ordering over the space of consumption bundles. There exists a continuous utility 
function U that represents these preferences, though any positive monotonic transformation of U 
also represents the same preferences.       
  Suppose the consumer is endowed with the bundle of goods  . The agent has a 
budget constraint for traded goods given by   
(,,) ezl
  jj jj
jj
xpx p e p =≤= m ∑ ∑  (1) 
There are prices  j p  for each traded good at which trades may be made.  We assume that all 
prices are positive.  We denote the “money” value of endowment at the price vector  
p by  .  Let  m F  denote the set of feasible consumption bundles. Let  X F denote the feasible set of 
traded goods. We make the following assumptions: 
 
A1. F  is a bounded, closed, and convex set in 
GH R RR
+ × × . 
  9A2. The set  X F  is bounded below in the sense that there exists some 
G x R ∈ with the property that 
X x Fx x ∈⇒ ≥l .   is bounded below by zero. 
A3. The utility function U is continuous. 
A4. The utility function U is strictly concave.   
A5. The agent’s utility function U is strictly increasing in at least one component of x.  The 
function U is strictly increasing in  .   l
 
Assumptions A3-A5 are much stronger than is required for our results. For example, the 
continuity of the utility function assumed in A3 could be derived from a continuous preference 
ordering. Assumption 4 assures that, given the budget constraint, the consumption bundle of 
traded goods chosen is unique. Assumption 5 means that there is always a valuable tradable good 
and ensures that the agent's budget constraint is binding. Assumption 5 also implies that holding 
all else equal the agent strictly prefers a longer life span. The assumption that agents strictly 
prefer more life to less is implicitly an assumption that the vector of goods being consumed is 
above some minimal level that makes life worth living and puts a bound on how low  x can be.   
We will have one non-tradable that we regard as health which we shall think of as a good. The 
other non-tradables may be goods or bads.    
Let us assume that that the agent faces (,,, ) p mzlwhere   is the price vector,   is his 
endowment of money (or the money value of an endowment of goods at the prices  ),  is an 
endowment of non traded goods and  is his lifespan. Consider the agent's optimal consumption 




  (,,, ) a r g m a x {(,, ) , }
x x pmzl Uxzl x F p x m =∈ ≤  (2) 
  10Note that changing an agent's life span may change their optimal consumption bundle.  We can 
now define the indirect utility function: 
  (, ,,) m a x {(,,) , }





   (4)  {( , , , ): ( , , ) } Sp m z l p x mx z l F =≤ ⇒
This is the set of endowments and trading constraints that limit consumption to be in  the 
consumption set  .    F
 
Proposition 1  
(,,, ) vpmzl is continuous and strictly increasing in  on the set  .    l S
Proof in Appendix. 
 
We now fix a reference endowment in terms of prices, money, and non traded goods other than 
lifespan. Let his reference point be( , , ,.)
rr r p mz . For the present we consider an arbitrary 
reference point; in the next section the reference point chosen will have ethical significance.    
 
A6. We limit the admissible allocations such that for all (,,) x zl F ∈ and  we have, 
for some 
(,,, ) pmzl S ∈
l, 
  (,,, 0 ) ( , , ) (,,, )
rr r rr r v pmz U x z l v pmzl ≤≤  (5) 
 
(,,, 0 ) ( , , , ) (,,, )
rr r rr r vp m z vpmzl vp m z l ≤≤  
  11This assumption limits the range of allocations we can consider.  The first inequality says that all 
allocations under consideration are at least as good as never being born. This rules out some 
allocations that are so bad that the agent would rather not exist. The second inequality rules out 
allocations that are better than an unbounded lifespan at the reference point.   
  We now examine the existence of a life metric utility function. The issues raised are 
similar to those for a money metric utility function (examined by Weymark (1985)). We define 
the direct life metric utility function over consumption bundles  (,,) x zl φ  implicitly by 
   (6)  (,,, ( , , ) ) ( , , )
rr r vp m z xzl Uxzl φ =
 
This is the lifespan lived at the reference point endowment that would give the same utility to the 
agent as the allocation (,,) x zl. We can define life metric indirect utility function by 
(,,, ) p mzl ψ implicitly by  
   (7)  ( , , ,(,,, ) ) (,,, )
rr r vp m z pmzl vpmzl ψ =
 
This is the lifespan lived at the reference point endowment that would give the same utility to the 
agent as the endowment  . It is immediate that   (,,, ) pzml
  (, ,,) ((, ,,) ,,) p mzl xpmzl zl ψ φ =  (8) 
 
Further 
   (9)  (, ,,(, ,, ) ) (, ,, )
rr r rr r rr r v pmz pmzl v pmzl ψ =
 
and hence, since v is strictly increasing in   we have for all l,  l
  (,,, ) )
rr r p mzl l ψ =  (10) 
 
  12Proposition 2   (,,, ) p mzl ψ exists, is unique, and is continuous over S. 
  (,,) x zl φ exists, is unique, and is continuous over F. 
Proof in Appendix 
 
Our approach to constructing life metric utility replicates the approach used by Hammond (1994) 
to construct money metric utility.  The only difference between the two approaches is in the 
range of allocations covered by the metric. The money metric cannot measure utility in states 
that are preferable to an infinite quantity of money or are worse than having no money.  We 
cannot measure utility in the life metric in states that are preferable to any bounded lifespan or 
are worse than never being born.  
   
3. Social Preferences    
We now consider a society with n people. To make matters simple we think of one cohort all 
being born at time zero. The social planer evaluates their welfare at time zero based on their 
planned lifetime consumption. We have no uncertainty. The feasible set of consumption bundles 
and preferences of each person i are assumed to obey the model set out in section 2. Each person 
i has a utility function   and associated indirect utility function  .  i U i v
We wish to construct social preference orderings over resource endowments and 
allocations of goods. We use the symbol f for a weak social preference (as least as good as). 
Given these social preferences we can define strict social preface    and social indifference over 
states A and B by: 
f
  A BA B a n d B A ⇔ ff f  (11) 
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The set (,  where  , ,) ii i pz ml ∈Γ 12 ... n SS S Γ =×× ×contains the admissible resource 
allocations for the society.   We also have social preferences over consumption bundles 
12 ( , , ) ... ii i n x ml F F F ∈Ω= × × × .  We assume society can also choose between a consumption 
bundle and a resource allocation. By considering the consumption bundles individuals choose 
given their endowment,  (,, ,) ii i i x pz ml , we have that a resource allocation generates a unique 
consumption bundle (by strict concavity of the utility function).   
  It is natural to think of social preferences as being over the consumption bundles that 
people actually consume. However, it is useful to also think of social preferences over 
endowments. If we undertake a policy to change someone's lifespan or access to a non-traded 
good, this changes their endowment and consumption of these goods. However, such policies 
can also affect the individual's optimal consumption bundle of traded goods and, in principle, we 
want to take into account these induced changes in our analysis.      
 
Definition: A social preference ordering fover (Γ, Ω) is well behaved if it is : 
(i) reflexive  
(ii) transitive 
(iii) continuous 
(iv)  complete 
and  
(v) (,   , ,) ((,, ,) ,,) ii i i ii ii i pz ml x pz ml z l  
(vi)( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i pz ml p z m l f if and only if ((,, ,) ,,)((' ,' ,' , ' ) ,' , ' ) i i i i i i i i ii ii x pz ml z l x p z m l z l f  
 
  14Conditions (i)-(iv) are standard.  Conditions (v) and (vi) imply that a resource allocation can be 
identified with the consumption bundle it generates after agents trade.  An endowment A is 
preferred to an endowment B if and only if the consumption bundle associated with A is 
preferred to the consumption bundle associated with B.  
These assumptions imply that we can consider social preferences over resource 
allocations as equivalent to the social preferences over the consumption bundles chosen by 
consumers with these endowments.  
 
Definition. A consumption bundle(,,) ii i x zlover n people is weakly Pareto superior to 
(' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl if and only if for each person i,  and for at least one person 
k,   
( , , ) ( ' , ' , ' ) iii i i i i i Uxzl Ux zl ≥
( , , ) ( ' , ' , ' ) kkk k k k k k Uxzl Ux zl >
 
Axiom 1  
If (,,) ii i x zl  is weakly Pareto superior to(' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl  then it is strictly socially preferred. 
 
We now assume at some reference point lives are equally valuable. Let the reference point be 
(,,, . )
rr r
ii R pmz = .  Each agent faces the same price vector, but different agents may have 
different endowments of money and non-traded goods at the reference point. There may be an 
ethical argument for treating people symmetrically and giving each person an identical reference 
point. However, current approaches to cost effectiveness analysis require different reference 
points for different people. We will undertake our theoretical analysis for a general reference 
point that may vary cross individuals, and investigate the choice of reference point that generates 
  15cost effectiveness analysis in the next section.  At the reference point society treats each person’s 
life as equally valuable and social welfare depends only on life spans.  
 
Axiom 2 
Let  0 δ ≥  be the rate of social time preference. There exists a reference point  (,,, . )
rr r
ii R pmz =  




rr r rr r t t
ii i ii i
ii
p mzl pmzl ed t ed t
δδ
′




rr r rr r t t
ii i ii i
ii
p mzl pmzl ed t ed t
δδ
′
−− ′ ⇔= ∑∑ ∫ ∫    
 
This implies if everyone has their reference endowment, and there is no discounting, we can 
derive the social welfare as the sum of discounted lifespans lived. It is immediate that for 
0 δ = we have 
(,,, )(,,, ) , 0 , 0
rr r rr r
ii i ii i i i i i
ii
pmzl pmzl l l f o r l l ′ ′′ ⇔ >≥ ∑∑ f ≥  
(,,, )(,,, ) , 0 , 0
rr r rr r
ii i ii i i i i i
ii
pmzl pmzl l l f o r l l ′ ′′ ⇔ =≥ ∑∑   ≥  
At the reference point the only variation between people that society considers is differences in 
life span, and society is indifferent as to who gets an extra discounted life year at the reference 
point.  Axiom 2 is clearly weaker than assuming that additional life years have equal social value 
in all circumstances; the more common approach to justifying cost-effectiveness analysis.   
  An important point is that our axioms do not conflict in any way. Note that Axiom 2 only 
applies at the reference point where the only variation between allocations is in life spans. If we 
  16have a Pareto improvement, where all life spans either stay the same or rise, Axiom 2 implies the 
Pareto improvement is preferred so there is no conflict. In cases where some people have 
increases in life spans, and others have reductions, we can apply Axiom 2 to find which 
allocation society prefers but in these cases the Pareto principle does not provide a ranking, and 
again there is no conflict. When one allocation is not at the reference point, or the changes under 
consideration involve changes in both life span and other goods, the Pareto principle may 
provide a ranking but Axiom 2 does not apply.    
  We now show that our axioms generate a unique social preference ordering. If the two 
axioms are accepted all social states (where preferences obey the assumptions set out in section 
2) can be ranked.    
 
Proposition 3. There exists a unique well-behaved social preference ordering on   that 
satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. This social preference ordering can be represented by the social 









δ − ∑ ∫ Γ and  over 
(,, )
0





δ − ∑ ∫ Ω where  i ψ  and  i φ  are the 
life metric indirect and direct utility functions respectively of person i given the reference point 
(,,, . )
rr r
ii R pmz = .  
Proof in Appendix.   
 
Proposition 3 says that to get social welfare we need to find the "life metric" utility of each 
person as set out in section 2, measured in life years, and add these up over people, after 
discounting the life years if appropriate.   The proof is based on the fact that the Pareto principle, 
and continuity of the social preference ordering, implies that if everyone is indifferent between 
  17two social states then society must be indifferent.  This means that society will be indifferent 
when we shift from any allocation to the reference point but with life spans adjusted to keep each 
individual just as well off as before. We can then compare any two allocations by shifting them 
to the reference point and valuing the different implied distributions of life spans using axiom 2. 
By transitivity of the social preferences, the ordering of the reference point allocations must be 
the same as the social ranking of the two original allocations.    
  We give results both for direct and indirect utility functions. The use of direct utility 
functions is appropriate when changes in lifespan and health can occur without changing the 
consumption of any other good. However, in many cases we can think of life spans and health as 
endowments and when these change and individual will re-optimize, changing their consumption 
of other goods.   For example suppose we have three goods, a consumption good x, a health 
state  , and lifespan l. Suppose we take  z x to represent the flow of consumption good in each 
period of life while   is the flow of health. With a constant personal discount rate  z i δ we might 
write lifetime direct utility as   







iii i iii Uxzl e uxzd t
δ − =∫
where   is the flow of utility per period, which we assume for simplicity is independent 
of age. Note that the individual’s rate of time preference 
( , ) iii uxz
i δ need not equal the social rate of time 
preference δ . We could use this model to analyze the effect of changes in health and life span 
holding the flow of consumption steady each period.  
  However we might imagine a case where the individual has the utility function as set out 
in (12) but maximizes this subject to the budget constraint that the net present value of 
consumption is less than an initial stock of wealth  . That is  i m
  18   (13) 
()
00






ii i i ii i i i xtUx tz l e ux tzd t s t ex t d t m
δ − − =≤ ∫∫
 
We can solve this optimal control problem using a Hamiltonian. In the social case where 
the rate of interest equals the rate of time preference, that is  i r δ = , the optimal path of 
consumption is steady over time and we can solve (13) for per period consumption to give the 
indirect utility function  
0
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With a fixed sum to allocate over his lifetime an increase in life span has two effects. It increases 
life years lived, but it forces the agent to spread their fixed wealth out over a longer life and 
consume less in each period. We could imagine more complex cases where a change in health 
affects worker productivity, and wage rates, and hence labor supply decisions and income. The 
use of the indirect utility function allows these indirect effects through changes in behavior to be 
taken into account when we evaluate the welfare effects of a change in health or lifespan.  
This unique social preference ordering has most of the desirable properties we would like 
in a coherent social ranking. Our social preferences generate a continuous, reflexive and 
transitive partial order, overcoming the reversal problems in standard cost benefit analysis. It is 
easy to show that it satisfies the Pareto principle and non-dictatorship which Arrow (1950) has 
proposed as desirable properties for a social choice rule.  
The two weaknesses in our social welfare function from a theoretical standpoint are 
incompleteness and dependence on “irrelevant alternatives”. There are a set of social states and 
individual preferences which our social preference ordering cannot rank. We need to assume that 
individuals always prefer more life to less, ruling out cases where people prefer a shorter 
  19lifespan, or are indifferent as to their lifespan. In addition, we cannot socially rank states that are 
so bad that individuals would strictly prefer never to have been born.  Nor can we rank states that 
are so good that they are preferred to living forever with the reference allocation. However, our 
social preference ordering is complete except on these states. Secondly the ranking of two social 
states depends on the existence of the reference point as well as the two states being considered. 
Removing this “irrelevant alternative” from the choice set would destroy our ability to compare 
states.     
Since Arrow (1950) shows that no social preference ordering based only on individual 
preferences can satisfy his desirable properties if completeness and independence of irrelevant 
alternatives are included, some weakening of these assumptions appears to be required. While 
our social preference ordering is incomplete in general, there appears to be a wide range of 
circumstances in which it can be usefully applied, and it is complete over the restricted set of 
preferences and endowments assumed in section 2. Cost effectiveness analysis usually measures 
health status relative to a reference point of full health. When we compare two health states we 
require the third “irrelevant alternative” of full health to exist for our ranking to occur.      
This approach to producing a well behaved social preference ordering, and social welfare 
function, by giving up completeness, has been examined by Chichilnisky and Heal (1983) and 
can be contrasted with the approach which maintains completeness but assumes the social 
planner has direct information in the form of a cardinal, interpersonally comparable, measure of 
each individual’s utility.  Sen (1977) and Blackorby et al. (1984) discuss the link between 
information available to the planner and the type of social preferences that can be derived. Our 
rankings depend only on individuals’ preference orderings, though our axioms allow us to 
  20generate from these preferences a cardinal, interpersonally comparable, utility measure for 
individuals with preferences from a restricted domain. 
  We can construct “life metric” utility by asking people what life span would be required, 
lived at the reference endowment, to make them indifferent between this and the state under 
consideration. Note that all that is required for this is for people to give rankings between states; 
we do not require any direct information on the intensity of their preferences. Our social 
preference ordering can, however, be represented by a cardinal utilitarian social welfare function 
made up of the sum of these individual “life metric” utilities.  
There is a common objection that valuing lives equally must violate the Pareto principle – 
we show this is not the case.  The argument is that if one person is willing to pay more for a life 
year than another we should “value” life more highly for the first and give them the life year, 
while potentially compensating the second to ensure both are better off.   When compensation is 
actually paid we have a Pareto improvement; our first axiom results in the Pareto improvement 
being socially preferred, even when the sum total of life years declines.  However, when 
compensation is not paid we face a purely distributional question; which person does society 
think deserves the extra life year more? Traditional cost-benefit analysis favors giving the life 
year to the person who is willing to pay more.  On the other hand, we assume that in this case (at 
the reference point) society values the claims of each person to an extra life year equally, 
independently of their willingness to pay for life in money units.  
Our two axioms imply that we wish to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that 
is the sum of people’s individual utilities. The only unusual aspect of this utilitarian approach is 
that utility must be measured in life years. Valuing lives equally in our formulation does not 
make maximizing life years lived a social goal; rather, it makes life years, lived at the standard 
  21level of income and health, a measuring rod for utility and social welfare. It is more usual for 
economists to use money as a measuring rod. The choice of a measuring rod for utility has no 
effect on Pareto efficiency; if everyone is better off their utility goes up whatever the metric, but 
it does have significant consequences when we add over gains and losses to decide distributional 
issues. 
While we have a unique social ordering, the ordering depends on the choice of reference 
point. Choosing a different reference point will generate a new, unique, social preference 
ordering. The effect of changing the reference point is familiar from the difference between 
compensating and equivalent variation in money metric welfare economics. Moving from an ex 
ante to an ex post reference point can change the ranking of social states.
2  
The choice of reference point appears arbitrary but it is really an ethical decision about 
distribution. Any reference point could be assumed but this choice, together with the Pareto 
principle, will generate a social preference ordering and will have implications for how society 
chooses between possible allocations. In this paper we focus on one particular reference point, 
the endowment that generates cost effectiveness analysis as currently practiced. Our axioms, 
together with this particular reference point, can therefore be used as a foundation for cost 
effectiveness analysis. In addition, since the axioms generate a social preference ordering we can 
extend cost effectiveness analysis to answer questions not usually addressed within its 
framework. 
     
4. Cost Effectiveness  
                                                 
2 We could reconstruct an axiomatic basis for cost benefit using the same approach as set out here with money 
metric rather then life metric utility.  We can then derive compensating or equivalent variation as the correct welfare 
measure depending on if we assume society values additional units of money equally for each person at the ex ante, 
or ex post, allocation.    
  22Suppose we have a fixed sum of money to spend on health care, how should this money be 
allocated? We assume a fixed sum K has been allocated to health and that providing a lifespan  
i l  at health state   to person i has cost  . We assume only one non-traded good   for 
each person and we identify this good as health status. we assume health policy affects only 
lifespan and health status and not endowments of other goods. We assume all costs are at time 
zero. Let I be the initial state. Given a reference point  we can measure the utility of 
each person in the initial state I , with health and lifespan  before the heath care funds K 
have been spent, by  where  
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Given the budget constraint we maximize social welfare given the budget constraint:   
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For a choice between two mutually exclusive policies A and B that both cost K we simply ask 
each person how many years lived at the reference point would be required make them 
indifferent to the health and lifespan associated with each policy.  
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Given a description of the health state   and life span   each person chooses a lifespan lived at 
the reference point that would leave them indifferent to the effects of the policy under 
consideration.  
i z i l
  A key issue is how we choose the reference point in order to derive cost effectiveness as 
the appropriate social decision rule.   In cost effectiveness analysis the reference health state is 
usually defined as full health, or perfect health. We take this to be  . However the prices, and 
p z
  23income, to be received in the reference state are usually left undefined. We assume that these are 
defined implicitly at their initial levels. Hence we take as our reference point :   
   (18) 
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Our reference point is perfect health and income for each individual at the initial level (without 
the intervention). We assume prices are fixed throughout the analysis we conduct. It would in 
principle be possible to define reference point prices as initial prices and take into account in our  
analysis any induced effect on prices from the health intervention.   
  Taking this reference point we may regard  as a measure of quality adjusted life 
years (QALYS) equivalent to policy A using the time trade-off method. It is the number of life 
years, lived in perfect health with the current endowment of other goods, that are equivalent to 
the individual to living   years in health state   as would be obtained with policy A, 
holding other endowments  equal. We then add up these reference point life years after 
discounting them at the social rate of time preference. Policy A is strictly preferred to policy B if 
and only if  
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The inequality in (19) can be written as 
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  We take the gain in quality adjusted life years for each person, discount these at the social 
rate of time preference, and add up over people.  The socially preferred policy is the one that 
gives the biggest gain in discounted quality adjusted life years. The incremental cost 
  24effectiveness ratio of a policy that produces life span and health  at a cost  can be 
written as 
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This is the cost per discounted quality adjusted life year gained by the policy.  
  If we can envision small changes in policy that result in differences in lifespan and health 
states across people the Lagrangian for the problem  (16) can be written as     
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The social welfare function is continuous since by proposition 2 each indirect utility function is 
continuous. It what follows we assume that all our utility functions, indirect utility functions, and 
the social welfare function, are twice differentiable so that we can explore marginal conditions. 
Crouzeix (1983) shows how differentiability of the indirect utility functions (and hence our 
social welfare function) can be inferred from assumptions on the differentiability of the 
underlying utility functions. We also assume the cost function is twice differentiable. Our 
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A more familiar way of writing this is as  
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the number of life years lived in the current state that equal a life year at the reference point for 
person i. Future quality adjusted life years are discounted at the social discount rate δ . This says 
that the marginal cost of an extra life year for each person, suitably adjusted by the quality of the 
life year relative to a year of perfect health and discounted if it is a future gain, should be the 
same for each person. The cost of a discounted quality adjusted life year for each person when 
social welfare is maximized should equal a common threshold value 1 λ.   
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Equation (26) indicates that to evaluate improvements in health status we convert these into 
equivalent (in the sense of having the same utility) changes in life years lived at the reference 
point, and discount these future, reference-point, life years. 
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Note that the social rate of time preference does not appear in equation (27). Equation  (27) is 
exactly the marginal condition we can derive for maximizing an individual’s utility subject to 
fixed health budget for that individual.  It follows that when judging if we should spend an extra 
dollar on a extending a person’s life, or improving the same person’s health status and quality of 
life, the comparison depends only on their own preferences and not on social preferences.  
  26  To make matters more concrete, we illustrate quality adjustment using an example. For 
simplicity, suppose we have only one good in addition to health status and lifespan. Suppose 
each person i has a utility function as set out in equation (12) with consumption of the “traded” 
good per unit time fixed independently of health policy. We can think of a flow of both 
consumption and health status that is constant over the person’s lifetime. The individual's 
lifetime utility is the sum of the discounted flow of period utility. 
  We take the reference endowments to be  
0 (,, . )
p
i x z  current income and perfect health, 
and assume that  , so agents prefer being alive to being dead at the reference point. 
Utility measured in life years at the reference point is given by  in the implicit function: 
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  Given that the consumption of other goods remains unchanged, the value of a marginal 






























Note that for a person is full health we have 
p
i zz = and  
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i ll i =  . For such a person a life year and 
a quality adjusted life year are the same. For a person in less than full health we will have 
 and   . For this person an extra life year will be worth less than a 
quality adjusted life year because it has a lower health state and because it comes at the end of 
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  27their lifespan (whereas a marginal quality adjusted life year would come sooner, at the end of a 
shorter life lived at full health).  
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Notice that the QALY compares extra life in the current health state to life at full health, 
in both cases with income fixed at the individual's initial level.  This means that when we quality 
adjust life years we adjust for health status but not for income. If we were to use the same 
reference point for each person, with fixed levels of both health and income, we would have to 
quality adjust life years in both dimensions.  
Different methods of quality adjustment have been proposed for  QALYs. We need to 
find the value of a life year lived in each health state in terms of a life year lived in perfect 
health.  It has been proposed that we use the patients own preferences for quality adjustment, or a 
measure of societies preferences as a whole, or expert opinion.  In our formulation quality 
adjustment is individual specific and reflects person being affects own preferences in trading off 
life years at the current health state versus life years at full health. 
Our approach also makes clear that a full reference point, over all goods, needs to be 
defined for quality adjustment. While measures of a QALY take perfect health as a reference 
point they should be precise in what will happen to other goods. One approach is measure 
welfare relative to a year of life with perfect health but the consumption of all other goods held at 
their existing levels. An alterative is to think of the measuring rod as a year of life with perfect 
health but the endowments of all other goods held at their existing levels. In this case we allow 
the agent to optimize their labor supply and consumption plans in light of their health status.  
  28This issue is reflected in the different results found by Garber and Phelps (1997), who fix the 
consumption of other goods, and Meltzer (1997) who fixes the endowment of other goods, but 
allows consumption to change subject to a budget constraint, when analyzing the cost 
effectiveness of health interventions for an individual. In this section we have assumed other 
consumption is held fixed when we undertake a health intervention. In the next section we 
consider health interventions combining with financing mechanisms that also change people's 
incomes and we have to take account of induced changes in consumption.          
 
5. Financing Health Care 
We now turn to the issue of how much of the government budget should be devoted to health 
care; an alternative way of thinking about this issue is how the threshold for cost effective 
interventions should be set. For simplicity we focus only on interventions that extend life span 
but do not affect the health state. We assume people are endowed with money at the beginning 
on life and the government finances health care using some of this money. We use the model set 
out in equation (13) and assume each person has a corresponding indirect utility function 
3 (, ,,) ii i vp mzl i
i
. 
We first assume that health care is financed through lump sum transfers. Each person is 
required to give a lump sum  , whose amount may be specific to the individual, to the 
government at the start of life for health care.  Life metric utility   is given by the 
solution to
i k
*(,, ,) ii i lp z m l
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ii i i i i p zml p z ml   . We assume the prices (in this case just the interest rate) are 
                                                 
3 We do not need to assume that the individual’s rate of time preference equals the rate of interest though the 
resulting indirect utility function may then be more complex than set out in equation (14).  
  29fixed throughout the analysis. We take the reference point health to be perfect health. We fix the 
reference point for income as the initial level of income prior to paying any tax.  
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the Largrangian for this problem is  
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The first condition is that the money raised for heath care should be spent cost effectively; we 
equalize the marginal cost of a discounted quality adjusted life year across people. This is 
equivalent to maximizing the discounted, quality adjusted, life years gained with the money 
raised. The second condition is that the value of money measured in discounted quality adjusted 
life years is the same across people. It is useful write these conditions as 
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In this formulation we have that the marginal cost of a discounted quality adjusted life year 
should be the same for each person, set at a cost effectiveness threshold 1/λ . The second 
condition is now that each person’s willingness to pay for a discounted quality adjusted life year 
equals the same threshold.  Note that these conditions together imply  
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which is the usual efficiency condition that the cost of a quality adjusted life year for each person 
equals that person's willingness to pay for it. This efficiency condition means that each person 
would rather have the health care than be given the money that would be saved if they were 
prepared to forgo the care.  
Garber and Phelps (1997) argue that for Pareto efficiency the marginal cost of health (a 
quality adjusted life year) should equal an individual’s willingness to pay. Cost effectiveness 
analysis equalizes the marginal cost of health across all individuals, which appears to violate this 
condition, leading them to argue that it is incompatible with Pareto efficiency. Equation (34) 
shows this conflict can be resolved; at the social optimum the cost of a discounted, quality 
adjusted, life year is the same across people, and equal to each person’s willingness to pay.  
Lump sum transfers all us to resolve the conflict by redistributing money from those with a low 
value of money to those with a high value of money, measured by their willingness to pay 
quality adjusted life years for money.       
A competitive market would achieve efficiency by allocating health care to those with the 
highest willingness to pay for it. However, this would not be socially desirable based on our 
second axiom.  We can instead achieve efficiency by redistributing income (through the lump 
sum transfers) to make the willingness to pay for money, in terms of health forgone, equal across 
households.  The social welfare function that follows from our axioms has significant 
implications for society's views on the optimal distribution of income. In cost benefit analysis 
efficiency dictates health care should be given to those most willing to pay money for it, while 
money transfers are used to address distributional concerns. In cost effectiveness analysis we 
  31address distributional issues by allocating health care equitably,  money should then by given to 
those most willing to pay health for it to ensure efficiency
4.   
With lump sum transfers we can achieve full Pareto efficiency in the allocation ;we keep 
transferring money until the marginal willingness to pay for money, in quality adjusted life years 
is the same for each person. However, it may be that due to information constraints, incentive 
effects, or political forces that resist redistribution, individual specific lump sum transfers are not 
feasible. In many countries health care is financed out of general taxation. We model this as a 
proportional income tax. The United Kingdom finances health care in this way and in addition, 
through the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, uses a cost effectiveness threshold for 
health interventions (Devlin and Parkin (2004)). We can ask the question, how should this 
threshold, and the implied tax rate, be set? This question cannot be addressed through standard 
cost effectiveness analysis but our axiomatic approach allows us to investigate the issue.    
  Again we consider only interventions to extend life spans. With health care financed only 
by a proportional tax rate τ  we have the social problem    
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Forming the Largrangian as before, the first order conditions for a maximum can be written as  
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Again we have that the taxes raised should be spent according to the cost effectiveness rule. The 
marginal cost of a discounted quality adjusted life year should be the same for each person, set at 
                                                 
4 Some economists may think that achieving efficiency by allocating health care to those most willing to pay money 
for is natural, while achieving efficiency by allocating money to those most willing to pay health for it is bizarre.  
The two are symmetrical from an efficiency perspective (as can be seen by re-labeling the goods); the advocacy of 
one approach over the other is evidence of the advocate's views on distribution.         
  32cost effectiveness threshold 1 λ. The second condition is that the cost effectiveness threshold for 
funding should be a weighted harmonic mean of each individual’s willingness to pay for a 
discounted quality adjusted life year, where the weights are income levels. The rationale for the 
weighting by income is that most of the burden of the proportional tax falls on the rich. The 
harmonic mean comes from the fact that we compute the value of the money losses due to the tax 
in quality adjusted life years units, which is the inverse of the willingness to pay money for an 
increase in quality adjusted life years. 
  It is easy to repeat the analysis set out here to find the appropriate cost effectiveness 
threshold for different methods of financing the health system. In each case we will be concerned 
with the value of money, measured in quality adjusted life year units, among those who bear the 
burden of financing health care.  Without lump sum transfers based on full knowledge of 
individual preferences the social planner is in a second best world and cannot achieve full 
efficiency. Money raised should be spent according to the cost effectiveness rule, but we may 
restrict the money available to the health system if the funds are coming from the poor, who have 
a high value (in life years) of money.   
  In our example here we have assumed that all of the cost of the health intervention is at 
time zero and falls on initial wealth. We could look at the effect of future costs borne on future 
wealth. There is a debate in cost effectiveness analysis on the appropriate discounting of future 
health gains and future money costs, and if these should be discounted at the same rate. This 
issue does not arise in our framework. Future quality adjusted life years are discounted at the 
rateδ . For future money costs we ask the people who will bear these costs the number of quality 
adjusted life years that they would be willing to give up to avoid these costs. These quality 
adjusted life years are then discounted at the rate δ like any others.       
  33     
6. Cost Effectiveness Analysis in Other Sectors 
  
The predominant methodology in use for project appraisal outside the health sector is cost-
benefit analysis, where a project is desirable if the sum of consumers’ willingness to pay (adding 
over gains and losses) for it is positive
5.  If the total willingness to pay summed over individuals 
exceeds the cost we could potentially compensate to losers by lump sum money payments from 
the winners, leading to a Pareto improvement. If it results in an actual Pareto improvement, in 
which no one loses and some gain, there seems to be a strong ethical case for such a project.  
However, without the compensation payments the ethical case for the cost-benefit criterion is 
much weaker; we have winners and losers and need to make a welfare argument that the gains of 
the winners outweigh the losses of the losers.  The results of a cost-benefit calculation can be 
justified if money is equally valuable to each person, so that money gains are equivalent to 
welfare gains, but it seems likely that the marginal utility money is lower for the rich than for the 
poor, making money an unsuitable metric for interpersonal comparisons of welfare (Boardway 
(1974), Sen (1977)). 
In terms of internal consistency, there is the problem that a project may meet the positive 
net willingness to pay criterion and be rated as socially desirable. However, having decided the 
project is to be carried out, the willingness to pay to stop the project may exceed the willingness 
to pay to keep it going.   Following the cost benefit rule, society will now decide not to have the 
project. In addition, even if refined to counter this problem, the cost-benefit rule fails to be 
transitive. Such inconsistencies in the social decision rule seem undesirable.      
                                                 
5 Formally, we can take this to be the compensating variation, the amount of money the agent could give up when 
the project occurs and be just as well off as before. 
  34  We now reconstruct cost benefit analysis to make it consistent with our social preference 
ordering.   Take the case where we have one non-tradable good   in addition to health status  . 
We also assume that consumption per period equals income per period    is fixed and not 
affected by the provision on the non-traded. This means we can work with the direct utility 
function rather than indirect utility. If we assume the social discount rate is zero, the gain in 
social welfare from changing the allocation of the non-traded good from   to  is simply: 
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Let us take as a reference point  .  We measure utility relative to a reference point 
with our initial levels of the public good and income, but perfect health. Utility measured in 
quality adjusted life years is given by the solution to  
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We assume that there is only one traded good and money is converted one for one into this good 
(we normalize the price to 1). If marginal changes in all variables are possible and our functions 















Note that the marginal utility of a quality adjusted life year on the left hand side of equation (40) 
is measured with variables set at the reference point while the marginal utility of the public good 
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is the willingness to pay in money units 















the rate at which life years convert into "life metric" utility measured at the reference point, our 
quality adjustment of life years as in cost effectiveness analysis.  We now have a linear 
approximation to the gain in social welfare is given by 
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=1 and the social value of a project at the reference 
point is given by consumers’ willingness to pay measured in life units (their willingness to pay in 
money units divided by their money value of a life year).  Away from the reference point of 
perfect health, the life years the agent is willing to pay have to be quality adjusted in the same 
way as for cost effectiveness analysis in the health sector.   
To give a concrete example again let  (, ,, ) ( )
i
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α = . This implies 
individuals do not discount future life years. Take as the reference point the consumption 
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Note that while the rich are willing to pay more money for the non-traded good in this example 
they are not willing to give up more of their lifespan for it. Those willing to pay the most life 
years are those with long lives who have little of the non-traded good.  
  To derive our life metric social welfare we need to convert the willingness to pay in 
current life years to willingness to pay life years at the reference point.  The rate at which current 



















Combining (46) and (47) we get the willingness to pay for the non-traded good in quality 
adjusted life years in our simple example is  
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This should be compared with equation (44) which is the willingness to pay in money units 
usually used in cost benefit analysis. In this example while a person’s income affects their 
willingness to pay money for the public good it does not affect their willingness to pay quality 
adjusted life years. Using cost benefit analysis, and willingness to pay in money units, great 
weight is given to the preferences of the rich. Those who are willing to pay the most are the rich 
who have little of the non-traded good. However if we make people pay in life years, not money, 
in our example the income level has no effect on willingness to pay.   
  Our example in this section assumes no social discounting; in general the quality adjusted 
life years each person is willing to pay should be discounted before adding up.  Neither have we 
considered the cost of the project. As with financing health care, the desirability of any project 
using cost effectiveness analysis depends on who pays for it. The benefits of a project measured 
by willingness to pay in quality adjusted life years must be compared to the costs measured in 
the same units.  Money costs must be converted to equivalent reductions in quality adjusted life 
years among those who bear the burden of these costs.  Our approach can also be used in cases 
where there are time costs as well as money costs to a health policy. In addition we can value 
projects such as water or sanitation, where there are direct use benefits as well as health benefits. 
Existing approaches to cost effectiveness analysis convert things into either health benefits or 
money costs, and it is sometimes unclear where things, such as time savings, should be 
accounted for.  In our axiomatic approach all cost and benefits should be converted to discounted 
quality adjusted life year equivalents before being summed up.    
  People may have difficulty in expressing their willingness to pay directly in quality 
adjusted life years. It is however quite feasible to calculate this from information on their 
  38willingness to pay in money units, their willingness to pay for a life year, and their valuation of 
life years at their current endowment relative to the reference endowment, as set out in equation 
(42).  
  Our extension of cost effectiveness for project appraisal outside the health sector has 
some parallels in the literature. Equation (42) can also be regarded as a form of weighted cost 
benefit analysis where we weight each person's willingness to pay in money terms to take 
account of distributional concerns (Harberger (1978), Brent (1984)).  Brekke (1997) investigates 
the effects of changing the numeraire in cost benefit analysis. Somanathan (2006) has advocated 
measuring willingness to pay in life units, rather than in money units.  Our use of discounted 
quality adjusted life years as the numeraire is very similar to these approaches.  
  The cost benefit analysis we have set out has several advantages over the standard 
approach. We do not get preference reversals and the rule is transitive. However, the question of 
whether we prefer existing cost benefit or our new approach is essentially an ethical one.  Does 
society think additional money is equally valuable to each person at the current endowment, or 
does it think additional life years at the reference endowment would be equally valuable to each 
person?  
Our social welfare function measures everything in units of quality adjusted life years 
and simply add these up over people. Becker et al. (2005) use a money metric approach to 
convert life span into money units to give find "full income" improvements over the last 
centuary.  Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009) construct a social welfare function by adding up “full” 
incomes combining life span with income in money units, allowing for social inequality 
aversion.   The difference between these approaches and ours is in the choice of a different 
  39numeraire, money rather than life years, for measuring individual utility before adding up over 
people. This choice has substantial consequences for rankings. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Overall our approach gives quite similar project appraisal for the health sector as is used in 
current cost effectiveness analysis. At the reference point, which we can take to be a life lived in 
good health, all (discounted) life years gained are weighted equally. For people whose health is 
not at the reference point, each life year gained is weighted by their own judgment of how many 
life years at the reference point would be equivalent.  This type of weighting is currently carried 
out using quality adjusted life years to adjust for different health states. 
  For non-health projects however, our project appraisal is quite different. Instead of using 
willingness to pay in money terms as a metric we use willingness to pay in life years; how much 
life would a person be willing to give up for the project? These life years are then adjusted for 
quality, as in cost effectiveness analysis, before being summed to give the total, quality adjusted, 
life year value of the project.  Our approach has the advantage of internal consistency. All 
projects can be ranked, and we avoid the reversals of ranking that occur in standard cost-benefit 
analysis. In addition our generalized cost-effectiveness analysis is a coherent method of project 
evaluation.  All measurements are now is quality-adjusted life years, and so we compare easily 
across sectors.   
For our axioms to generate cost effectiveness analysis we need to impose a particular 
reference point. All welfare is measured relative to a life year lived in perfect health with the 
endowment of other goods the same is at present.  If the reference point changes, all our internal 
consistency results remain, but our social preference ordering, and ranking of projects change. 
  40Shifting the reference point at which lives are valued equally will usually produce a completely 
new, and different, social preference ordering. This is manifested by a different method of 
quality adjusting life years when we carry out in cost effectiveness analysis. For example we 
could argue that the correct reference point was perfect health and a fixed “adequate” level of 
income. In this case we would quality adjust life years not only for their health status relative to 
perfect health but their income relative to the “adequate” level. Our approach shows these  
arguments about how to quality adjust life years are equivalent to arguments about the correct 
social preference ordering. 
  We consider the welfare of a single cohort, of a fixed size, under certainty. This sidesteps 
difficult issues associated with intergenerational distribution, and uncertainly.  With many 
generations we have to address issues of discounting both across and within generations.  
Introducing uncertainly, and assuming that social preferences satisfy the axioms of expected 
utility theory, places additional restrictions on the allowable social preference orderings  




Proposition 1   is continuous and strictly increasing in  on the set  .    (,,, ) vpmzl l S
Proof. Continuity is straightforward. Note that the budget set for traded goods does not depend 
on the lifespan  .   Let  and denote the optimal feasible consumption bundle at  by  l n l →l l *( ) x l  
so that  .  Fix  (,,, ) (* ( ) ,, ) vpmzl Ux l zl = 0. ε >  
Suppose for infinitely many n we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε < − .  
  41Since the consumption set of traded goods is closed and bounded compact we can choose a 
subsequence  such that 
k n l *( ) n x l converges. Then since U is continuous we have  
lim ( , , , ) lim ( *( ), , ) lim ( *( ), , ) ( *( ), , ) ( , , , )
kk k k
kk k
nn n n nn n v p m z l U xl z l U xl z l U xl z l v p m z l
→∞ →∞ →∞ =≥ = =  
 This contradicts every point in the infinite sequence  being at least  (,,,) n vpmzl ε  below 
  (,,, ) . vpmzl
Now suppose that for infinitely many n we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε >+ . 
Again by compactness we can construct a converging subsequence  *( )
k n x l  converging to x′say 
.  Hence 
lim ( , , , ) lim ( *( ), , ) ( ', , ) ( *( ), , ) ( , , , )
kk k
kk
nn n nn vpmzl Ux l zl Ux zl Ux l zl vpmzl
→∞ →∞ == ≤ =  
which contradicts every point in the infinite sequence  being at least  (,,,) n vpmzl ε  above 
  (,,, ) . vpmzl
It follows that for any   0 ε > we have  (,,,) (,,, ) n vpmzl vpmzl ε − ≤  for all but finitely many nand 
it follows that   is continuous in l.    (,,, ) vpmzl
To see that indirect utility is strictly increasing in  , note that when lifespan increases the 
agent can feasibly consume the same set of communities as before, with a higher lifespan. Since 
utility is strictly increasing in    utility at this feasible bundle is strictly  higher than before. 
Optimal consumption must give at least as high a utility as this feasible consumption, and hence 
indirect utility function is strictly increasing in l. 
l
l
   
 
Proposition 2   (,,, ) R pmzl ψ exists, is unique and continuous.  
(,,) R x zl φ exists, is unique and continuous over F. 
proof. Given (,,, ) p mzl, then by assumption 6 
  42(,,, 0 ) ( , , , ) (,,, )
rr r rr r vp m z vpmzl vp m z l ≤≤  
Now consider the indirect utility function   as a function of lalone.  This function is 
continuous, and strictly increasing by proposition 1. Hence by implicit value theorem for 
continuous functions (Jittorntrum (1978)) there exists a unique  such that 
(,,, )
rr r vp m z l
* l
(,,, * ) ( , , , )
rr r vp m z l vpmzl =  and  *( , , , R lp m z ) l ψ =  is continuous over  (,,, ) p mzl S ∈ . 
The proof for   (,,) R x zl φ is similar.    
 
Proposition 3. There exists a unique well-behaved social preference ordering on   that 
satisfies Axioms 1 and 2. This social preference ordering can be represented by the social 









δ − ∑ ∫ Γ and  over 
(,, )
0





δ − ∑ ∫ Ω where  i ψ  and  i φ  are the 
life metric indirect and direct utility functions respectively of person i given the reference point 
(,,, . )
rr r
ii R pmz = .  
Proof.  We first address existence. Consider the social welfare function  over 
(,, ,)
0





δ − ∑ ∫ Γ 
and  over   where 
(,, )
0





δ − ∑ ∫ Ω i ψ  defined by. This generates social preferences over states by 
taking weak preference if and only if the social welfare function gives a value that is at least as 
high as the alternative. By proposition 2 every resource allocation in Γ and consumption bundle 
in Ωcan be ranked by this function so the preference ordering is complete on ( , ). It is easy 
to see it is a reflexive and transitive social preference ordering since the ordering of the real 
numbers is reflexive and transitive. Proposition 2 also ensures that this social welfare function, 
and the associated social preferences, are continuous. Hence these social preferences satisfy 
Γ Ω
  43conditions (i)-(iv). Now consider preferences over comparisons of resource endowments with 
consumption bundle. Conditions (v) and (vi) are satisfied immediately by the definitions of the 
direct and indirect life metric utility functions.   Hence this social preference ordering is well 
behaved. 
This social ordering also satisfies the Pareto principle. Suppose  is weakly 
Pareto superior to (' . Then for every consumer i we have  
(,, ,) ii i pz ml
,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l
(,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i i i pz ml p z m l ψ ψ ≥ and for some consumer k we have 
(, , ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) kk k k k k k k pz m l p z m l ψ ψ > and hence  ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ > ∑ ∑ so that weak 
Pareto improvements are ranked higher on our social order. Similar arguments apply to 
comparisons of consumption bundles, and our social preferences satisfy axiom 1.  
 
The social ordering also satisfies condition (vi), we value lives equally at the reference point. To 
see this, consider two allocations that have different life spans at the reference point: 
(,,, ) , (,,, )
rr r rr r
iii iii p mzh pmzh ′ .  We the have that  
(,,, ) (,,, )
rr r rr r
i iii i iii i i
ii i i
p mzh pmzh h h ψψ ′ ′ >⇔ ∑∑ ∑ > ∑  
 Hence an allocation of lifespans at the reference point ranks higher than on our social welfare 
function if and only if the total years of life gained is larger. It follows that the ranking generated 
by the social welfare function  (,, ,) ii i i
i
p zml ψ ∑  satisfies axiom 2. 
 
We now turn to uniqueness. We first prove that our axioms imply that if each individual is 
indifferent between two endowment vectors then society must be indifferent between them. 
  44Consider two endowment vectors (, and ('  and assume that each individual 
is indifferent between their allocations in the two vectors.  
, ,) ii i pz ml ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l
Converting each endowment to an allocation, let 
(,,) ((,, ,) ,,) i ii i ii ii x zl xpzml zl =  
(' ,' ,' ) (( ' ,' , ' ,' ) ,' ,' ) ii i i i i i i x zl x p zml zl =  
Now consider the strict convex combination allocation for  
() a λ = (' ,' ,' ) ( 1 ) (, ,) ii i i i i x zl x z l λ λ +−  
By A4 preferences are strictly convex so we have that  () a λ is Pareto superior to both  
(' ,' ,' ) ii i x zl and (,,) ii i x zl for  (0,1) λ∈ . 
Hence by axiom 1  () (' ,' ,' ) (,,) ii i i i i ax z l x z l λ f  for 01 λ < < . 
Now by continuity of the social preference ordering taking limits as  0 λ → we have 
( 0 ) ( ', ', ') ( , , ) ii i i i i ax z lx z = f l  
Similarly taking limits as  1 λ →  
( 1 ) ( , , ) ( ', ', ') ii i i i i ax z l x z l = f  
It then follows that   
(' ,' ,' ) (, ,) ii i i i i x zl x z l    
Now by condition (v) for a well behaved social preference ordering we have   
(' ,' ,' , ' ) (,, ,) ii i i i i pz m l p zml    
Hence if every person is indifferent between two allocations society must be indifferent between 
them.  
 
Now consider two arbitrary (agents need not be indifferent between them) endowments  
  (' ,' ,' , ' ) , (,, ,) ii i i i i pz m l p zml
  45Suppose  ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ ≥ ∑∑  so based on the social preference ordering 
constructed in the first part of the proof  is weakly preferred to .  (,, ,) ii i pz ml (' ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l
Now suppose that there exists an alternative, well behaved, social preference ordering satisfying 
axioms 1 and 2 with    (' ,' ,' , ' ) (,, ,) ii i i i i pz m l p zml f
By definition 
(,,,( ,, , ) )
rr r
ii i i p mz p mzl ψ
i   (,, ,) ii i pz ml   
and hence  
(,,,( ,, , ) )
rr r
ii i i p mz p mzl ψ   (,, ,) ii i pz ml  
since we have shown that if all individuals are indifferent between two endowment vectors any 
well behaved social preference ordering satisfying axiom 1 must be indifferent between them. 
Similarly 
(,,,( ' ,' , ' , ' ) )
rr r
ii i i mz pmzl ψ
i   (' ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l   p
and 
(,,,( ' ,' , ' , ' ) )
rr r
ii i i mz pmzl ψ   (' ,' ,' , ' ) ii i pz m l   p
 By assumption  
( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ ≥ ∑∑  
hence by axiom 2 
(,,,( ,, , ) )(,,,( ' ,' , ' , ' ) )
rr r rr r
ii i i i i i i p mz p mzl pmz pmzl ψψ f  
It follows that we have  
( , , , ) ( , , , ( , , , ) ) ( , , , ( ' , ', ', ') ) ( ' , ', ', ')
rr r rr r
ii i i i i i i ii i i ii p zml pmz p mzl pmz pm z l pz m l ψψ  f    
By transitivity of the social preference ordering, this implies that  
  46(,, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l f  
A contradiction.  
Hence the set of weakly preferred points to a particular allocation is the same for any well 
behaved social preference ordering satisfying axioms 1 and 2. Similarly, be considering a pair of 
allocations such that  ( , , , ) ( ' , ', ', ') ii i i i i i i
ii
p zml pz m l ψψ > ∑∑ we can use the same argument to show 
that (,  in well behaved social preference orderings satisfying axioms 1 
and 2. It follows that the set of strictly preferred points to a particular allocation is the same for 
any well behaved social preference ordering satisfying axioms 1 and 2. It follows that there is 
only one well behaved social preference ordering satisfying our two axioms. 
, ,) (' ,' , ' ,' ) ii i i i i pz ml p z m l f
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